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Death of a few celebrated truths
and others still worth re-stating1
by
Maurice GODELIER*
ABSTRACT
Firth produced a great work but he was also a great
man. Having set out to study political economics in New
Zealand, Raymond Firth encountered Malinowski and
decided to become an anthropologist. The fieldwork and
books followed, on subjects ranging from Polynesia to
the housing projects of London. Some of these were
masterpiece, likeWe, The Tikopia (1936) orTheWork
of the Gods in Tikopia (1940). An immensely rich
store of ethnographic material, laid out precisely and
clearly but also theoretical works on key areas: religion,
symbols, etc. in which, well before the postmodernists,
Firth voiced his skepticism about «grand theories»,
Marxism, Structuralism, etc. The author of the lecture
next asks the question: Why should we celebrate a great
anthropologist if anthropology is nothing more than a
bunch of narrative fictions written by Europeans with
the complicity of their native informants (Marcus) and
is therefore a dying literary genre? He replies that there
are two ways of deconstructing a discipline: one that
leads to its dissolution and the other that leads to its
reconstruction on a more rigorous and analytically more
effective basis. The author opts for the second way and
analyses several issues: the distinction between the ima-
ginary and the symbolic, and their respective roles in
producing social relations. He then seeks to identify
among all social relations, those that have the capacity
to bind a certain number of human groups into a Whole
that endows them with an overarching shared identity
and makes them into a society. He shows that the only
relations that have this capacity are political-religious
relations, not kinship relations or economic relations.
Lastly, considering the trade of the anthropologist, he
sets out a number of conditions that must be fulfilled in
RÉSUMÉ
Firth, une grande œuvre mais aussi un grand homme.
Ayant commencé en Nouvelle-Zélande des études d’éco-
nomie politique, Firth rencontre Malinowski et choisit
de devenir anthropologue. De la Polynésie à la banlieue
de Londres en passant par la Malaisie, les terrains et les
livres se succèdent et s’accumulent parmi lesquels des
chefs-d’œuvreWe, The Tikopia (1936) ouTheWork of
the Gods in Tikopia (1940). Un matériel ethnographi-
que d’une immense richesse exposé avec précision et
clarté mais aussi des ouvrages théoriques sur des domai-
nes clés : la religion, les symboles etc. où Firth manifes-
tait bien avant les critiques des post-modernistes un
scepticisme vis-à-vis des « grandes théories », le
marxisme, le structuralisme, etc.
L’auteur pose alors la question : Pourquoi célébrer un
grand anthropologue si l’anthropologie n’est qu’une
suite de récits-fictions écrits par des Européens « avec la
complicité de leurs informateurs-indigènes » (Marcus)
et est donc un genre littéraire en voie de disparition ? Il
répond en montrant qu’il y a deux façons de déconstruire
une discipline, l’une qui aboutit à la dissoudre, l’autre à
la reconstruire sur une base plus rigoureuse et analyti-
quement plus efficace. Empruntant cette seconde voie, il
analyse successivement plusieurs problèmes : la distinc-
tion entre l’imaginaire et le symbolique et leurs rôles
respectifs dans la production des rapports sociaux. Il
cherche ensuite quels sont parmi tous les rapports
sociaux, ceux qui ont la capacité de lier un certain
nombre de groupes humains en un Tout qui leur confère
une identité globale partagée, qui en fasse une société. Il
montre que seuls des rapports politico-religieux ont une
telle capacité dont sont privés les rapports de parenté et
les rapports économiques. Enfin réfléchissant sur le
1. This text was pronounced as the 1st Inaugural Raymond Firth Memorial Lecture, at Marseille, July 8, 2005, at the 6th
Conference of the European Society for Oceanists.
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order for this job to constitute a scientific, critical
approach more necessary than ever for analyzing and
understanding the new world order that sprang up with
the fall of the Berlin Wall and the Twin Towers attack on
9/11/2001.
K: Polynesia, Melanesia, Tikopia, Tonga,
making babies/children, kin-based societies,
political-religious relations, imaginary-symbolic,
postmodernism, deconstruction, participant obser-
vation, writing ethnography.
métier d’anthropologue, l’auteur dégage un certain nom-
bre de conditions à remplir pour que ce métier constitue
une démarche scientifique et critique plus nécessaire que
jamais pour analyser et comprendre le nouvel ordre
mondial né avec la chute du mur de Berlin (1989) et les
attentants du 11 septembre 2001.
M- : Polynésie, Mélanésie, Tikopia, Tonga,
conception des enfants, sociétés fondées sur la
parenté, rapports politico-religieux, souveraineté,
imaginaire-symbolique, post-modernisme, décons-
truction, observation participante, écriture ethno-
graphique.
Whoever has not yet read We, the Tikopia
(1936) orThe Work of the Gods in Tikopia (1940)
should rush to the library and discover two clas-
sics of our discipline that weave a spell with the
wealth and detail of their ethnographic data,
their clarity of style and the empathy present on
every page between the young anthropologist
and the men and women who guided him to an
understanding of their conception of the world
and their manner of living together.
Raymond Firth, a great work and a great man
In the ﬁrst part, I would like to look back over
the outstanding points of a work and an excep-
tional career of a man whose life spanned more
than a century, since Raymond Firth, born in
1901 in Auckland, died in Great Britain on
February 22nd, 2002. Firth thus witnessed all of
the important changes and transformations in
our discipline since Malinowski put ﬁeldwork
center stage with the publication of his Argo-
nauts of the Western Pacific in 1923. It was after
reading Malinowski that the young Raymond
Firth switched from the study of economics to
anthropology, although he retained his keen
interest in the economic relations people
contract with each other to produce their means
of existence and their material wealth. It was
Malinowski himself, to whom Firth had been
introduced by Seligman, who in 1934 invited him
to take up a lectureship at the London School of
Economics. In 1944, Firth succeeded Mali-
nowski and occupied his chair until his own
retirement in 1968. It was, in fact, while reading
economic anthropology (which was my initial
area of interest in anthropology) that I ﬁrst
encountered and came to admire Firth’s work.
That was in 1967. I had had a serious accident in
New Guinea and had been transported to Syd-
ney for medical treatment. There I spent a good
deal of time in the university library, where I
read Firth’s Primitive Polynesian Economy,
published in 1939. One passage in particular
struck me, which I copied out:
«I analyzed the economic structure of the society
because so many social relationships were made most
manifest in their economic content. Indeed the social
structure, in particular the political structure, was
clearly dependent on speciﬁc economic relationships
arising out of the system of control of resources.»
(Firth, 1965 [1939]: )
At the time, I had approached economic
anthropology as aMarxist; in other words, I was
tempted tomake economic relations the founda-
tion of social life, to see them as the key to
understanding the kinship system, the political
relations and the religious institutions found in a
society. It seemed to me that Firth was pointing
in the same direction; but in reality, later in the
book, he stressed that the explanation for the
inequality between a Polynesian chief and the
commoners lays basically in the representations
of the divine origin of the chief’s power rather
than in the material sphere of human existence.
Thisstatementappearedtocontradictthepreced-
ing passage and to stem from a rejection of
Marxism. In reality, I was later to realize that
Firth was right and that he had clearly perceived
the limits of the Marxist explanation of the
nature of societies and their history by modes of
production alone, Marx’s «meta-narrative», as
Lyotard termed it in his 1977 La Condition post-
moderne. Firth had not waited for postmoder-
nism to voice his skepticism about all-
encompassing theories; he took the same
attitude toward Lévi-Strauss’ structuralism.
No other anthropologist has devoted nine
books and dozens of articles to describing and
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explaining the workings of a small society of
slightly over 1500 people living on a little island
in the eastern Solomons. In 1928, when Firth
ﬁrst set out into the ﬁeld, the Tikopia’s old ritual
and political organization was almost intact, as
themissionaries that had arrived in 1924 had not
yet had an impact on their social organization.
Alternatively, the second time he came to do
ﬁeldwork, in 1953, he found the society deeply
divided. One of the four clan chiefs had conver-
ted himself to Christianity, together with all of
his fellow clan members, in order to destabilize
his rival, theTe Ariki Kafika, the highest-ranking
chief on the island and the key ﬁgure in the
fertility rites. In 1962, on the occasion of Firth’s
third stay, the whole island had converted to
Christianity, and the major rituals had been
abandoned; but the chiefs still had political
authority over the rest of the population.
In sum, three periods of ﬁeldwork in the same
society several years apart enabled the anthropo-
logist to observe the fundamental changes that
had occurred in this society, to circumscribe the
causes and mechanisms, in short, to see and to
understand how local history came to pass,
which, on Tikopia as elsewhere in the South
Paciﬁc, could no longer be explained by internal
causes alone but called on external forces resul-
ting from Western expansion on a global scale.
In 1985, Firth sent me a copy of his
Tikopia¢English dictionary and, in 1990, in col-
laboration with Mervyn McLean, he published
another book, completed by a tape, entitled
Tikopia Songs: Poetic and Musical Art of a Poly-
nesian People of the Salomon Islands (Cambridge
University Press).
But Tikopia was not enough for Firth. In
1939, with his wife Rosemary, he began a ﬁeld
study of a Malaysian community of peasant
ﬁshermen, on whom he published, in 1946,
Malay Fishermen: Their Peasant Economy. Back
in London, he launched two research projects on
family and kinship in a working-class area of
London, then in a middle-class area, thus
becoming a pioneer of European urban
anthropology.
But Firth did more than write monographs.
He has to his credit ten or so theoretical works in
which he admits to being skeptical of grand
theories and concentrates instead on analyzing
Elements of Social Organization (1951), Sym-
bols, Public and Private (1973) and lastly, a few
years before his death,Religion (1996), a book in
which this son of a very strict Methodist father
stoutly affirmed that religion, «including ideas
of God is clearly a human construct», which can
of course encourage one to respect and love
others but also can act «as a force of destruction
as violent collisions of religious wars have
demonstrated in many faiths».
Here is a great man and a great work.
Is anthropology dead? Postmodernist voices
But a question arises: We hear a variety of
voices questioning the legitimacy of anthropo-
logy and denying its scientiﬁc value. Why then
celebrate the memory of a hero of this discipline
if it is, if not dead, at least in rapid decline?
I believe these colleagues are in error; but since
it seems that a number of anthropologists are
going through a crisis, we need to listen to their
reasons and offer a response. For the reasons are
not all the same. Some invoke historical reasons;
others, epistemological grounds. The ﬁrst consi-
der that the events of the end of the twentieth
century deprived anthropology of the object it
had set for itself in the nineteenth century. Born
at the height of the colonial, commercial and
cultural expansion of a few Western nations,
some of which ushered in the era of industrial
market production, anthropology, or ethnology,
as it was then known, set itself the task of disco-
vering and understanding the ways of thinking
and acting found in the hundreds of societies
Western nations were gradually conquering by
dint of their weaponry, their trade and their
administration. And these nations felt they had
every right to do so because they came bearing
civilization and the one true religion, Christia-
nity. But it was also in the twentieth century, in
the last decades of that time in world history
which was to end in the independence of the
colonized peoples, that numerous publications,
whose scientiﬁc value had not yet been called
into question, focused on the Trobriand Islan-
ders, the Tikopia, the Nuer, the Kachin, and
many others.
This time is now the past. The Tikopia, the
Nuer, the Kachin and the rest still exist physi-
cally, but their social structures and their cultu-
res have changed profoundly. Todaywe are going
through another phase of global domination by
aWest, without a rival since the fall of the Berlin
Wall in 1989 and the collapse of the socialist
system but also deeply contested, as shown by
the 9/11 attack on the Twin Towers. In today’s
globalized world, local cultures are increasingly
hybrid mixtures cobbled together from bits and
pieces of precolonial customs that escaped the
ravages or have been reinvented, tailored to
Christianity and the new forms of social organi-
zation borrowed from or imposed by Western
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culture: parliamentary regime, political parties,
churches, sects, new calendar, and so on.
In view of these facts, some have proclaimed
the death of anthropology and its replacement
by sociology, better suited to analyzing
evermore-urbanized societies caught up in the
global market, with a portion of their popula-
tion forced to emigrate in search of a living or a
better life. According to these prophets, anthro-
pology has become useless or even undesirable in
those societies where it once ﬂourished and now
has no other choice, if it is to subsist, but to fall
back on the study of the Western world that
engendered it, and there to apply the methods
and concepts it developed to analyze the way the
non-Western world thought and lived.
But this view of the death of anthropology in
the rest of the world and its rebirth in theWest is
ﬂawed because it overlooks a certain number of
facts. Throughout the twentieth century, anthro-
pologists continued to do ﬁeldwork in Europe
and the US, and not only to study ethnic
minorities, Basques or Chicanos. Furthermore,
urban anthropology was not a product of
decolonization. Raymond Firth was one of its
pioneering ﬁgures since, at the end of the
SecondWorld War, before the end of the British
Empire, he had already launched his two studies
on the evolution of the family and kinship in
London.
Listening to me, you are probably tempted to
conclude that all is well with our discipline. Born
in the colonial era, it has survived the decoloni-
zation of non-Western countries and has even
found a second wind and an unlimited ﬁeld of
action in Western countries. Do not cry victory
too soon, though, because, for the last twenty
years, or nearly, another group of our colleagues
has been busily deconstructing anthropology.
They declare to all whowill listen that, before the
colonial era and after, anthropology never was
and never has been what it claimed to be,
namely: a «science» of understanding others. To
prove this, a few have undertaken a critical
re-reading of the major monographs that
claimed to give us an understanding of theNuer,
Dinka, Tikopia and others. On the positive side,
they have pointed out the silences that pervade
these texts: that of women, who were usually
absent, that of the colonial administrators, and
so on. But others went further. For them, these
monographs were no more than narrative ﬁc-
tions, in which the author ¢ a Westerner ¢ in
abstract terms, tells more about him- or herself
than about others, disguising his or her prejudi-
ces and stereotypes as scholarly formulas. For
some of the most virulent postmodernists, no
anthropological text, regardless of the author’s
knowledge of the language, length of stay, or the
nature and richness of the study, possesses any
particular authority that would enable us to
understand the way individuals and groups
belonging to societies other than our own think
and behave. For these critics, the anthropolo-
gist’s interpretation is only one among any num-
ber of equally «true» interpretations.
Have no fear; I am not going to lump together
everyone who claims to be or whom others claim
to be a «postmodernist». Clifford Geertz is not
Stephen Tyler; Jameson is notMarcus, andMar-
cus is not Rabinow. With the exception of
Geertz, many are ex-structuralists and/or
ex-Marxists who have been struggling to survive
ever since Lyotard declared that our postmodern
condition of existence began with the death of
major narratives, or meta-theories. In place of
Lévi-Strauss, Meyer Fortes, Leach or Sahlins,
the newmaîtres à penserwereDerrida, Foucault,
Deleuze and, of course, Lyotard and a few
others. Seen from France, the spectacle was
sometimes astonishing. Two thinkers like Fou-
cault and Derrida, strongly at odds in France,
found themselves cheek by jowl or even lumped
together on the same philosophical-
anthropological page by an American colleague.
Yet Foucault’s early work falls under the hea-
ding of history of Western institutions: prisons,
mental hospitals, etc.; whereas, in his second life,
he turned to a history of sexuality and the pro-
cesses of personal individuation. Derrida strove
to demonstrate the twofold impossibility of rea-
lizing and surpassing Western metaphysics as
revived by Heidegger, after Kant, Marx and
Nietzsche had, each in his own fashion,
proclaimed the irreversible death of Western
philosophy.
Positive deconstruction; or, deconstructing, not to
dissolve but to reconstruct
Letme be clear. It is entirely normal from time
to time to deconstruct the concepts and conclu-
sions that anthropology presents as «truths». All
sciences do this andmust do so. But there are two
ways of deconstructing a discipline: onemakes it
possible afterwards to reconstruct it with greater
conceptual andmethodological rigor and a clea-
rer awareness of its strengths and limits. The
other ultimately leaves the discipline in a thou-
sand pieces or simply liquidates or dissolves it ¢
as we see in the case of anthropology, for exam-
ple ¢ into the amorphous essays we ﬁnd ranged
under the heading of Cultural Studies.
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In the rest of this lecture, I will attempt to keep
to the ﬁrst path, that is to say: positive decons-
truction. Among the celebrated truths I believe
we can now pronounce dead, I am going to try to
show that no society has ever thought that aman
and a woman were sufficient to make a child,
whether the baby was an ordinary or an extraor-
dinary being, a child or a man¢god. From there,
I will try to show that the famous statement that
there is something called «kin-based societies» is
meaningless. In no place and at no time has it
ever been the case that kinship relations ¢ even in
societies lacking castes, classes or a State ¢ and
even less the family, has the ability to draw a
number of kin groups or other social groups
together into a society. I will also show that the
economic relations of production and exchange
do not have this capacity either. The question is,
then: what social relationships have the capacity
to make societies and how do they do this? Afte-
rwards, I will look at the nature and the impor-
tance of the imaginary realities that are one of
the constituents of kinship and political-
religious relations, and at the role of the symbo-
lic practices through which these relationships
are staged and enacted. And last of all, I will
draw a few conclusions for the exercise of our
profession in our globalized world. For, along-
side a number of truths that have died and
should be buried with all due haste, there are
some others worth re-stating and putting into
practice.
Nowhere do a man and a woman suffice to make a
child. A few examples
Before a human baby is born it must have been
conceived. I have compared the representations
once and sometimes still held by twenty-six
societies of the way babies are made: of these
societies, thirteen are in Oceania, four in Asia,
four in Indian America, three in Africa and two
in Europe. Much to my surprise, in not one of
these societies were a man and a woman suffi-
cient to make a child. What they made was a
fetus, which became a whole child only through
the intervention of yet other agents: ancestors
and/or gods. I will limit myself to four examples.
First of all, the Baruya, a NewGuinea society
divided into patrilineal clans and formerly cha-
racterized in political-religious terms by large-
scale initiations of males but also females. The
Baruya believe that the man’s semen produces
the bones, the ﬂesh and the blood of the fetus
growing in the woman’s womb, while the woman
is nothing but a container, a bag, gilya, who
transmits nothing to her child. As soon as the
woman senses she is pregnant, the couple has
intercourse as often as possible because the
man’s semen nourishes the fetus. The father is
thus the sole genitor of a fetus that as yet has no
nose, mouth, ﬁngers or toes. It is the Sun, the
father of all Baruya, who ﬁnishes the child in the
womb and imparts his breath. The child is born
with a human body, it breathes but it still does
not have a soul. Later, a spirit-soul enters the
child’s body when the father gives it a name,
which is that of a patrilineal ancestor. But if the
baby is a boy, he must be born again, this time
from the body of men. That is the aim of the
male initiations, which bring together all boys of
the same age whatever their lineage or home
village. [Around the age of ten, they are separa-
ted from their mother and the women’s world.
At this time, the boys are introduced to homo-
sexual relations with the third- and fourth-stage
initiates, youngmen who have not yet had sexual
intercourse with a woman and who give the boys
their semen to drink.] Through this exclusively
male rebirth, Baruya men take upon themselves
the right to single-handedly represent and
govern their society, without the participation of
women.
It is clear that the Baruya’s pre-contact repre-
sentations were directly linked to the nature of
their kinship system, which combines patrilineal
descent reckoning with political-religious rela-
tions that go well beyond the sphere of rela-
tionships between kin, lineages and clans. They
not only affirm the Baruya’s shared identity as
sons and daughters of the Sun, a cosmic power
but also a tribal god who endowed them with
their human form and the breath of life; they
also legitimize the fact that one part of the
society, themen, gives itself the right to represent
the whole society, to govern it, and as a group to
exercise their domination over the women and
non-initiated males.
I will take a rapid look at two other Oceanic
societies, chosen because both entertain two
conﬂicting theories of the way babies are made:
the Telefolmin, who live in the mountains at the
headwaters of the Sepik River, known to us
through the work of Dan Jorgensen; and the
inhabitants of the former «kingdom» of Tonga.
The Telefolmin kinship system was cognatic,
with no clans or lineages. Village life centered on
the male cult centering on the bones of famous
men, one of the aims of which was to curb the
slow drift of the universe towards nothingness.
Women were strictly excluded from this worship.
There was an «official» theory to explain the way
children were made, publicly shared by men and
DEATH OF A FEW CELEBRATED TRUTHS 185
women, according to which a fetus is formed
when «penis water» mixes with the woman’s
vaginal ﬂuids. This theory is in accordance with
the cognatic character of their kinship system.
But the women had their own secret theory.
According to the women, sperm indeed mingled
with their vaginal ﬂuids to make the child’s ﬂesh
and blood. But it was their menstrual blood, and
it alone, that made the bones. It was the women,
then, who had made the bones of the great men
worshipped by the men in a cult from which
women were excluded. You will now be less sur-
prised to learn that, in 1978 and 1979, the Tele-
folmin women, converted to Christianity and led
by a Protestant minister from another village
and a neighboring tribe, destroyed the sacred
relics and burned the cult houses.
The example of the former kingdom of
Tonga, one of the most stratiﬁed Polynesian
societies before the Europeans arrived, presents
us with fundamental historical changes that
occurred over the centuries preceding the arrival
of the Europeans and which widened the gap
between the mass of commoners without rank
or title (the tua) and the eiki, who formed a sort
or aristocracy around the lineage of the Tu’i
Tonga and his sister, the Tu’i Tonga Fefine, direct
descendants of the most powerful god in the
Polynesian pantheon, Tangaloa. An absolute
barrier separated the eiki from the rest of the
society, for, as in Tikopia, they were the sole
possessors of mana, the power present in their
bodies, which bore witness to their closeness to
the gods. All eiki had authority over a portion of
the territory, and over the person, labor and
products of those who lived there. But, unlike
the ariki, the Tikopia chiefs, the eiki’s authority
was always delegated and ﬂowed from the person
of the paramount chief, the Tu’i Tonga.
Before the Europeans arrived bringing Chris-
tianity, two theories coexisted in Tonga. The
oldest andmost widespread corresponded to the
cognatic nature of their kinship system and their
religious beliefs, and gave the gods and the
ancestors the preponderant role in human des-
tiny. According to this theory, the man made the
baby’s bones and skeleton from his semen, while
the woman made its ﬂesh and blood from her
own blood. Then a soul, a gift from the ancestors
and the gods, took possession of the fetus and
made it a child.
In the secondmodel, this time the whole subs-
tance of the fetus came from the woman: its
ﬂesh, blood, bones, skin and so forth. Semen
played only one role: it kept the menstrual blood
in the uterus. The clot that formedwasmade into
a fetus and then into a child with the help of the
gods, and above all of the Tu’i Tonga, the para-
mount chief who is a man-god. In this version,
the man completely disappears as his children’s
genitor. He prepares his wife for fertilization by
the Tu’i Tonga, who, as Françoise Marsaudon
has shown, impregnates all the women of his
kingdom with his semen that has become a
fecundating breath, a «pneumatic» seed, as the
Ancient Greeks would have said. We see that the
second model was not conceived to magnify
women’s procreative capacity but to exalt the
mana, power of the supreme eiki, theTu’i Tonga,
as well as to exclude all male commoners from
the process of creating human life. In this way,
the Tu’i Tonga added to his responsibility for the
fertility of the earth and the sea, stemming from
his divine nature and the rites over which he
presided, the responsibility for impregnating all
the women of his kingdom. He thus became the
«Father» of all Tongans, and his kingdom
became one kainga, one big family, attached to
his person and dependent on him. This second
model seems to have arisen directly from the
profound political and ideological mutations
that ultimately made the Tongan nobility a
«quasi-class», with the right to dispose of the
land and the person of the mass of commoners.
Unlike the guyau and the Trobriander para-
mount chief, or the four Tikopia ariki, the Ton-
gan aristocracy had ceased taking part in pro-
ductive labor in order to devote themselves
entirely to the performance of rites, warfare and
pleasure, while nevertheless controlling the pro-
duction of subsistence goods and their redistri-
bution. The offerings owed to the chiefs and the
gods already smacked of tribute and forced
labor, and no longer had the taste of festivals
and free gifts.
But where does the West stand in all this?
Might we be the only civilization to think that a
man and a woman alone, through their sexual
union, suffice to make a child? How wrong we
would be. Before the West discovered that
women are XX, and men, XY, the way babies
were most usually thought to be made had its
source in Christian thought. So, what is a child
for a Christian?
For theologians, a child is ﬁrst of all an
embryo and then a fetus resulting from sexual
intercourse between a man and a woman joined
by the sacrament of marriage, and who, when
their bodies unite, become one ﬂesh, una caro.
Their single ﬂesh is passed on to their children,
who are «ﬂesh of their ﬂesh». This representa-
tion corresponds to the nature of European
kinship systems, which are cognatic and use an
Eskimo-type terminology that emerged in
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Europe at the end of the Roman republic, after
the disappearance of the old «Sudanese»-type
Latin system. Such a representation of sexual
intercourse would be completely unacceptable
and disgusting for a Baruya, a Trobriander or a
Telefolmin woman. But there is more. For a
Christian, a man and a woman are not sufficient
either to make a child. All they can make is a
fetus, which lacks the essential ingredient: a soul.
This soul is introduced into the child’s body
when God so chooses. What is this soul like?
Hildegard von Bingen, a great twelfth-century
mystic, described and even painted one. The soul
is like «a ball of ﬁre that in no way resembles the
human body and which takes possession of the
heart of this form», the fetus, which in turn looks
like a miniature human being, a homunculus.
But that is not the whole story either. For
Christians, each human being receives a distinct
soul from God, which can never be that of an
ancestor, as in the case if Trobrianders and
Inuits. By endowing each of us with a soul, God
continues, down through the centuries, to create
the world. That is why missionaries of every
Christian denomination do not like ancestor
cults, especially if the ancestor effects his or her
own reincarnation without the help of God. We
saw this in the case of China, when Western
missionaries forced new converts to abandon
ancestor worship and break their tablets. The
Chinese Emperor, perfectly aware of the close
connection between respect for ancestors and
obedience to the State, quickly put a stop to
Christian proselytizing and expelled all missio-
naries from the Kingdom.
Whether it is the Baruya man’s semen alone
thatmakes the fetus, or the woman’s blood alone
that ﬂows in the bodies of Trobriander children,
whether the Tu’i Tonga fertilizes the women of
Tonga with his spermatic breath or the Christian
God introduces into the body of each child that
is born a soul that cannot be confused with any
other, all these representations of the way chil-
dren are made are realities of the mind, imagi-
nary explanations staged and enacted through
various symbolic practices: ingestion of semen
for the Baruya, baptism for Christians. But they
also have consequences for Baruya and Chris-
tian social life that are, this time, neither imagi-
nary nor purely symbolic.
Concerning the role of kinship, the economy and
political-religious relations in making societies
Why is it that kinship relations do not have the
capacity to make a certain number of human
groups into a society? What social relationships
have this capacity? Failing kinship relations,
might it be relations of production and
exchange, the mode of production as suggested
byMarx and his followers? Once again, my reply
is negative, even though I was once a Marxist
myself. What answers did my seven years of
ﬁeldwork among the Baruya provide? After
having, with the constant help of the Baruya,
recorded the population of every one of their
villages and hamlets, pieced together the genea-
logy of every person, recorded all exchanges of
women, all alliances between lineages over ﬁve
generations, after having spent every day for a
year measuring more than six hundred gardens,
taking down the names of the individuals and
the lineages that had cleared the space in the
forest, and the reasons for and the circumstances
of these clearings, after having recorded the
names of all of the men and women who then
cultivated these plots and shared what they pro-
duced, and noted the relations of kinship, neigh-
borliness or friendship that connected these men
and women, I came to a twofold conclusion:
Neither the relations of kinship and the many
kinds of exchange that accompanied the
exchange of women, nor the economic relations
of cooperation and exchange involved in the
production of their material conditions of exis-
tence and their wealth (pigs, shells, etc.) created
general ties of social and material dependence
between each Baruya and the other members of
his or her tribe. None of these relations was
capable of providing a common basis on which
to build a society. These were in no way «all-
encompassing» social relationships, that is rela-
tionships capable of making all these kin groups
into a whole, an overarching social group exis-
ting as such and capable of reproducing itself as
such under the shared name of «Baruya».
In the case of the Baruya, what were those
social relationships that were capable of drawing
them all together into a single whole so that each
depended on all the others, whatever their
lineage and their village, in order to reproduce
themselves as Baruya? These social relationships
were the ones engendered by the workings of
institutions, which in turn entailed and required
the material and social cooperation of all linea-
ges and all villages in order to exist and repro-
duce themselves. The institution, in this case, was
the large-scalemale and female initiations. Every
three years or so, for the space of several weeks,
everyone, men and women, mobilized to build
the Tsimia, the big ceremonial house where part
of the initiations of the boys and young men
took place. But a year earlier, they had needed to
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make new gardens in order to feed the initiates
and everyone who helped in their initiation, feed
and take care of the hundreds of guests from
neighboring tribes, friends and enemies having
struck a truce for the duration of the ceremonies
and having come to see those with whom they
would marry or ﬁght tomorrow. It was in these
circumstances that the Baruya expended addi-
tional labor in order to produce a surplus over
and above their ordinary needs, destined here
not to reproduce their own lineage but to repro-
duce the Baruya as a society exercising what we
could call a kind of sovereignty over a territory
whose boundaries are known if not recognized
by their neighbors. This shared sovereignty that
must be defended by armed force is manifested
by the fact that the Baruya, whatever their clan
name and lineage, carry a «big name» that unites
them. They are BARUYA.Where does the name
come from? It is the name of the clan that claims
to have received, directly from the Sun, at the
time of the ﬁrst men, the men of the «dream-
time», or wandjinia, the kwaimatnie. Kwaimatnie
are the sacred objects and secret formulas ena-
bling the Baruya to re-engender boys without
the aid of women, and to make them into men:
warriors, shamans and cassowary hunters, with
the help of the Sun, the Moon and the founding
ancestors.
I therefore conclude that what makes
«society» the world over, and not only in the case
of the Baruya, are the social relations that
human groups (and not only kin groups) pro-
duce among themselves in order to affirm their
shared sovereignty over a territory and which
thereby ﬁnd themselves joined together, in view
of reproducing themselves as a whole, whatever
may be the nature of the kinship relations or the
economic relationships linking each of these
groups to others belonging to the same society.
Furthermore, we have seen clearly that the way
in which a political-religious sovereignty over a
territory is affirmed and exercised is not to be
confused with the way the resources of this ter-
ritory are exploited, with the mode of produc-
tion and exchange that characterize a given
society.
I will cite several facts that adduce further
proof to the general thesis I have just set out.
First of all, the fact, acknowledged by both the
Baruya and the neighboring friendly and hostile
tribes, that the territorial group that now calls
itself the Baruya did not exist three centuries
ago. It was in the wake of a bloody conﬂict
between the lineages and villages of the Yoyué
tribe, whose territory lays near Menyama, that
the survivors of several clans, one of which was
called «Baruya», sought refuge with the Andjé,
at a distance of a few days’ walk. There, after one
or several generations during which their chil-
dren had been initiated alongside those of the
Andjé, the refugees conspired against their hosts,
massacred a number of themwith the complicity
of a local clan, the Ndélié, and took over their
territory. Then the descendants of the refugees
and the native inhabitants who had helped them
erected their own Tsimia in order to initiate their
boys and make them into warriors or shamans.
They took the name Baruya, from the name of
the clan that owned the most powerful kwaima-
tnie.
Firth describes a comparable process in his
enormous body of work devoted to the social
organization and history of the Tikopia islan-
ders. As you know, the islanders were divided
into four non-exogamous clans ranked in the
following order: Kafika, Tafua, Taumako and
Fangarere. The chief of the Kaﬁka clan, the Te
Ariki Kafika, occupied the highest position in
the cycle of rites ensuring the fertility of the
land, the sea and the people, described by Firth
in the Tikopians’ own words as «the work of the
gods». The preeminence of the Te Ariki Kafika
was based on the fact that the central god of the
Tikopian pantheon was the divinized ancestor
of the Kaﬁka clan. This ancestor was an excep-
tional being, who gave the Tikopians the laws
and rules that organize their society. After
having been killed by a jealous rival, he joined
the gods in the sky, the atua, and received from
the most powerful god the mana that established
his supremacy over the other local gods and gave
his descendants, the Kaﬁka clan chiefs, primacy
over the other chiefs.
Note in passing the parallel between this story
founding theTe Ariki Kafika’s power and that of
the Tu’i Tonga, the man-god who ascended into
heaven to meet his father, the most powerful god
in the Polynesian pantheon; killed by his divine
brothers, he was restored to life by his father,
who gave him ﬁrst place among his divine sons
and among all human beings. We are looking,
here, at facts of the same nature. It is the
political-religious relationships that make the
Tikopia clan into a whole and ensure the repro-
duction of this whole. With one fundamental
difference with respect to the Baruya society: in
Tikopia the chiefs hold the rights to the land and
grant commoners the right to cultivate it.
It is because of these political-religious rela-
tionships, then, that Tikopia society operated as
a whole. However, the four clans that comprise
this society today descended from the human
groups that occupied the island at different times
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and originally came from a variety of islands,
Ontong Java, Pukapuka, Anuta, Tonga,
Rotuma, etc.; moreover, these groups fought
before ﬁnding their place in the political-
religious hierarchy connected with the «work of
the gods» and placed under the ultimate autho-
rity of the Te Ariki Kafika.
I am going to add one last example, taken this
time from outside the South Paciﬁc, one that is
often in the spotlight on the present-day world
stage. The case of Israel illustrates the difference
between a «community» and a «society», a fun-
damental distinction that sociologists and
anthropologists often have a tendency to forget.
The Diaspora Jews, who lived, sometimes for
centuries, in other societies in Russia, Argentina,
France, the United States, Morocco, etc., made
up particular communities within the host socie-
ties, but they themselves were not a society. But,
after the SecondWorldWar, many Jews left, and
are still leaving their countries and moving to
Israel. To be sure, they ﬁnd the same divisions as
before between Sephardim and Ashkenazim,
between Russian Jews and Moroccan Jews, and
so on. But they now all form a «society» that is
constructing itself on a territory conquered by
armed force and governed by a parliamentary
State charged with representing and defending
the interests shared by all citizens of the State of
Israel, including the Palestinian Arab minority
living in this territory.
Concerning the distinction between the imaginary
and the symbolic, and the roles they play in produc-
ing social relations
I now come to the last point: the distinction
between the imaginary and the symbolic, and the
necessity of not confusing the two if we want to
understand the role each plays in producing the
many forms of social life that we see. The imagi-
nary arises in themind. It is made up of all of the
representations humans have conceived or will
conceive of the nature and origin of their uni-
verse and the beings that inhabit it. The imagi-
nary is ﬁrst of all a world of the mind, the world
of representations. And like all representations,
it is at the same time the product of an interpre-
tation of what it represents. The imaginary is the
totality of all the interpretations human beings
have invented to explain to themselves the order
or disorder that reign in the universe, so as to
draw conclusions for the way humansmust orga-
nize their life in society. The imaginary is there-
fore a real world, but one composed of realities
of the mind, mental realities (images, ideas, opi-
nions, reasonings, etc.), which, insofar as they
are inside the individual mind, remain unknown
to those around and can therefore not be shared
by them or act on them.
The symbolic is comprised of themanymeans
bywhich originally imaginary realities are embo-
died in amaterial support that endows themwith
a perceptible form and mode of existence that
allows them to be seen and communicated. This
«material form» can be a word, a gesture, a
posture or a body decoration, an object that has
beenmade or found. But whatever the forms and
material realizations, the symbolic is nothing but
all of the signs invented by human beings to
communicate. In their essence, symbols partake
of language, but their language overspills the
words of languages and speech on all sides; sym-
bols are used to stage and enact the realities
invented by the mind so that we may act on the
world and on ourselves, and achieve the objecti-
ves we have set for ourselves.
The imaginary is not the symbolic, then. But it
cannot have any social existence or effectiveness
if it is not embodied in symbolic signs and prac-
tices. Symbols die, however, or take on other
meanings when the contexts in which they arose
and the minds that worked them out disappear
from the daily lives and memories of men and
women.
The analysis cannot end here, however. For
the role of the symbolic largely surpasses
making the invisible visible, making mental rea-
lities into social and material realities which fall
under the sway of the senses. The role of the
symbolic is also to endow imaginary realities
with «truth» once they have taken the form of
the social realities in which the fundamental sta-
kes of society reside: access to the gods, control
of the land, exercise of power.
Because symbolic practices endowmental rea-
lities with the twofold quality of being «social
realities» whose existence at the same time fur-
nishes proof of their «truth», we understand
why these practices also attest to the «legiti-
macy» of the social order they create or in which
they are contained. Let us take for example the
Baruya rites that stage their myths and trans-
form their beliefs into visible truths in such away
that the mental realities in the form of myths
apparently begin to exist independently of the
minds of those who conceived and developed
them. But the same problem arises each time.
What appears to be the «true reality» for
members of one society usually appears as a
«purely» imaginary reality to outside observers
who do not share the same cultural and social
universe.
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It is easy for us to select examples from our
preceding discussion to illustrate our conception
of the imaginary and the symbolic. All we have
to do is to recall two ethnographic facts already
analyzed: the myths that found the relatively
modest power of the primary Tikopia chief, the
Te Ariki Kafika, and those founding the formerly
grandiose power of the Tu’i Tonga and his sister,
the Tu’i Tonga Fefine, the paramount chiefs of
the kingdom of Tonga. Both of these chiefs
owed their rank and power to the divine charac-
ter of their lineage’s founding ancestor.
But in Tikopia and Tonga we are no longer
among the Baruya. The issue involved in these
myths and rites is no longer merely to establish
themen’s right to govern the society and exercise
their dominion over the women. Baruya society
is not divided between nobles and commoners.
In Tonga and Tikopia, only noble men and
women have rights over the land, the waters of
the rivers, the sea; and they merely allow com-
moners to use them. The nobles alone perform
the large-scale seasonal rites because they them-
selves are of divine origin. And in Tonga, the
Tu’i Tonga as well as the sino’i eiki, the «chiefs-
in-the-body», had almost absolute power over
the person and the possessions of the commo-
ners. This was not the case in Tikopia, where,
according to Firth, in the area of the economy,
inequalities were especially a question of degree,
whereas in the spiritual and social domains the
inequalities were of nature, and irreducible.
In short, all of our analyses lead to the oppo-
site conclusion from Lévi-Strauss and the
so-called «symbolic» theories of anthropology.
In his famous preface to Mauss’ work (1950),
Lévi-Strauss affirmed the primacy of the symbo-
lic over the imaginary, a thesis that Lacan took
up three years later in his «Discours de Rome»,
in which he broke with Freud. For me, if one of
these domains has primacy over the other, it is
clearly the imaginary. Without the idea that
Jesus of Nazareth was the Son of God who died
on the Cross to redeem humanity from its sins,
the symbol of the Cross ¢ two pieces of wood,
one shorter than the other, joined at the top of
the longer piece ¢ has no special meaning.
Contrary to Lévi-Strauss, «myths do not think
themselves» through men, and, contrary to Roy
Wagner, «symbols don’t stand for themselves».
In reality the primacy lies neither in the ima-
ginary nor in the symbolic. It lies in the nature of
the real issues at stake in society: access to land,
to power, to the forms of wealth in a society, to
control of men’s and women’s labor, to the pro-
ducts of their labor, to the gifts and favors of the
ancestors and the gods. These are the fundamen-
tal assets to which the imaginary representations
of the world and of society, as well as the social
institutions to which they have given rise, pro-
vide access. It is therefore essential to understand
that the social consequences of imaginary repre-
sentations and the symbolic practices that
endow them with the quality of being true, that
these consequences themselves are not imagi-
nary and cannot be reduced to symbols.We have
seen this in the example of the Baruya society:
there, women were really and not symbolically
deprived of the right to own land, to use wea-
pons, to produce the bars of salt money; and
their access to the gods was severely restricted.
The conclusion to be drawn from these facts is
clear: the imaginary and the symbolic are dis-
tinct, inseparable realities, but they do not
exhaust the totality of social reality. Social rea-
lity is always and everywhere constructed from
stakes that are not only imaginary nor purely
symbolic. These can be summed up in a few
questions: who in the society has the right to
exercise power and why? Who has access to the
wealth and why? Who is allowed to communi-
cate with the gods and ancestors and why? Who
is allowed to control the person, labor and pro-
duct of the labor of others and why? History
offers us an enormous range of answers to these
questions, which everyone can understand and
which are crucial to understanding history. Our
whole analysis of the necessity of distinguishing
between the imaginary and the symbolic in order
to understand both the ways in which they are
conjoined and the role each plays in the produc-
tion of societies leads us to conclude that the
opposition accepted and even cultivated by
many anthropologists, beginning with Boas,
between cultural anthropology and social
anthropology is a partial (in both senses of the
word) approach to the historically dated social
realities we are seeking to analyze and unders-
tand.
Concerning a few truths worth speaking
Having slain these venerable and venerated
anthropological «truths», I will conclude by
affirming two or three other «truths» still worth
re-stating and even more worthwhile practicing.
Anthropologywill continue to develop in both
non-Western and Western societies. Further-
more, anthropologists no longer come only from
theWest. More than ever we must ask ourselves:
under what conditions can anthropology be a
scientiﬁc discipline and not the projection of
the ethnocentric biases of the anthropologist,
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whether he or she is from the West or not? In
reality, anthropology together with the other
social sciences can exist as a scientiﬁc discipline
because they presuppose two basic facts that can
be summed up as follows: the social otherness of
the other is never absolute but always relative, and
whatever some people have invented in order to act
on the world and on themselves, other people can
understand without necessarily having to identify
with it.
How are we to understand something we have
not invented ourselves or experienced in our own
society? For an anthropologist, we know how to
proceed. It is indispensable for the anthropolo-
gist to construct a cognitive Self, distinct from
the social Self bestowed by birth and the social
environment; and from the intimate Self, the Self
of fortunate or unfortunate encounters with
others. This cognitive Self is full of concepts,
theories andmethods, all attached to a historical
context. But whatever the context, the anthropo-
logists’ first rule is that they must decenter the
cognitive Self with regard to the intimate and
social Selves. The second rule is that they must
maintain a state of critical vigilance against the
intrusion into their cognitive Self of their own
society’s ways of thinking and acting. In addi-
tion, concepts and theories should be used as
tools to be abandoned or modiﬁed when neces-
sary in order to account for what is observed.
The crucial experience, however, is ﬁeldwork.
But ﬁeldwork is not merely a few months spent
in investigation and chewing the fat around the
ﬁre with a few informants. Fieldwork involves
methodical observation and participation.
Methodical observation means starting by lear-
ning the language, gaining acceptance so as to be
present in the various contexts of the lives of the
people of the society under observation. But
above all it means months of systematic studies
carried out on the various aspects of the social
life of the society. This is howone learns the rules
people follow in order to think and organize
their actions on others and on themselves. And if
the studies are systematic, one will ﬁnd out
whether or not people say what they do and do
what they say.
Participant observation: participation in what and
how far do you go?
But the big difference between anthropolo-
gists and the members of the societies they
observe is that, for the latter, their rules, their
representations and their values constantly serve
to produce their concrete conditions of exis-
tence. This is not the case for the anthropologist.
We talk about participant observation, but what
do they participate in and how far should they
go? Everyone knows that an anthropologist’s
participation in the life of others very quickly
reaches its limits. It is not enough to go hunting a
few times with the Inuits and on those occasions
help feed the others and feed oneself. To partici-
pate fully, the anthropologist would have to
marry into the band, have children and raise
them. This is not what happens, and it is not
necessary for it to happen for anthropologists to
do their job.
The last step comes when it is time to write
about others. For the cognitive Self is not only an
intellectual Self, it is also an ethical and a politi-
cal Self: an ethical Self because anthropologists
adhere to a code of practice; a political Self
because anthropologists have to be aware of the
relationship between their society and the
society that has taken them in. Last of all,
anthropologists have to write books, make ﬁlms,
etc. It is therefore advisable to have some talent
for writing or making ﬁlms so as to arouse the
necessary empathy between readers and specta-
tors and the individuals of the society one is
talking about. But the literary qualities of an
anthropologist do not make the text a literary
text, and this for two reasons that Derrida and
his emulators have not taken into consideration.
The ﬁrst is that, unlike Macbeth, which sprang
from Sheakespeare’s head, the Kula existed well
before Malinowski set foot on Kiriwina. The
second is that no one can complete Shakes-
peare’s work after his death. Whereas Fred
Damon, Nancy Munn, Annette Weiner, Jerry
Leach, etc., were able to enrich and correct
Malinowski’s analysis of the Kula ﬁfty years
later.
Anthropologists thus did not wait forGeertz’s
«Notes on the Balinese Cockﬁght» (1973) or
Marcus’ text on «The Uses of Complicity in the
Changing Mise en Scène of Anthropological
Fieldwork» (1997) to develop a critical reﬂexive
awareness of their own concepts and practices. It
is erroneous and absurd to claim that, throu-
ghout the colonial era the relationship between
Western anthropologists and the men and
women who were their informants and collabo-
rators was nothing more than a collusion to
produce «ﬁctions that each side accepts» (Mar-
cus, 1998: 110). In the conclusion to the last
article he wrote on the Tikopia, entitled «The
Creative Contribution of Indigenous People to
their Ethnography» (J.P.S. 2001, vol. 110, no 3),
just after he had received the Polynesian
Society’s Nayacalou Medal for «signiﬁcant
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publication on the Island Paciﬁc», Raymond
Firth, who had just turned 100, wrote:
«Be all that as it may, for me ethnography and social
anthropology in general as they have developed, have
been the creation of both alienwestern and indigenous
contributors.» (Firth, 2001: 245)
That was in 2001. Firth died a few months
later, on the day our sister association, the ,
wasmeeting inNewZealand, in the citywhere he
was born and at the university where he received
his ﬁrst two degrees.
The future of anthropology
Today more than ever, anthropology is cons-
cious of its analytical and critical strengths, but
also of its limits; for it cannot account single-
handedly for the complexity of societies and
their transformations down through time.
Having shaken off the origins that tied it to
Western expansion and domination of the rest
of the world, anthropology has become a power-
ful tool for analyzing the changes and contradic-
tions besetting the modern world born with the
fall of the BerlinWall in 1989 and the attacks on
the Twin Towers on September 11th, 2001.
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